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ABSTRACT. We examine the relationship, across 39 coun-
tries, between regulation and entrepreneurship using a new
two-equation model. We find the minimum capital requirement
required to start a business lowers entrepreneurship rates across
countries, as do labour market regulations. However the
administrative considerations of starting a business – such as
the time, the cost, or the number of procedures required – are
unrelated to the formation rate of either nascent or young
businesses. Given the explicit link made by Djankov et al.
[Djankov et al. 2002, The Regulation of Entry, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 117(1), 1–37] between the speed and ease
with which businesses may be established in a country and its
economic performance – and the enthusiasm with which this
link has been grasped by European Union policy makers – our
findings imply this link needs reconsidering.
KEYWORDS: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, nascent
entrepreneurship, regulation, World Bank Doing Business,
young businesses.
JEL CLASSIFICATIONS: K20, L26, L51, M13, O57.
1. Introduction
SME and Entrepreneurship policy makers
seeking to increase rates of new firm formation
and subsequent wealth creation are faced with
choices. The central choice is to either follow a
low regulation route or to follow a high
‘‘support’’ route. The low regulation route fo-
cuses policy upon two areas. The first is to
enable the starting of a business to take place
as quickly and cheaply as possible. The second
is to minimise the number and severity of
regulations upon that business whilst it is
trading. The US is seen as the exemplar low
regulation country.
The alternative policy is for government to
provide ‘‘support’’ to new and small firms,
funded by the taxpayer. It can be in the form of
information, advice, training, or finance to new
firms or existing small firms. EU countries have
traditionally favoured ‘‘support’’ policies.
However, Djankov et al. (2002) claimed to
show that countries where business regulation
was most burdensome are more likely to be
undemocratic, characterised by official corrup-
tion, have larger unofficial economies and lower
levels of wealth. This finding was highly influ-
ential, triggering the introduction of legislation
in countries to lower the ‘‘barriers’’ to new
business creation. EU countries, where such
barriers were high, responded. Between 1999
and 2006 France reduced the number of days
taken to start a business from 53 to 8. Other
examples are Spain where the number of days
fell from 82 to 47 and Italy where they fell from
62 to 13.
Thispaper investigates the linkbetweenbusiness
regulation and new firm formation in 39 countries.
It suggests that the association between the time
and costs of starting a business and several
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measures of entrepreneurship is by no means as
clear as implied by Djankov et al. (2002). However
it does find that labour market regulations depress
measures of entrepreneurship. Our conclusion has
to be that there is a need for a serious review of
this policy area, with better data being a key
requirement.
Our results are obtained by estimating a new
two-equation model while 112 averaged country
data points covering both developed and devel-
oping countries are used. The first equation ex-
plains the nascent entrepreneurship rate using
policy regulations and various controls. The
second equation explains the young business
entrepreneurship rate using policy regulations,
various controls and the nascent entrepreneur-
ship rate. This enables us to discriminate be-
tween direct effects on the young business
entrepreneurship rate and indirect effects
through the nascent entrepreneurship rate be-
cause the nascent phase precedes the young
business phase.
The paper begins by setting out some
hypotheses on the relation between entrepre-
neurship and policy intervention. It then moves
on to describe the data available and presents
some simple tables. The modelling framework is
then presented, followed by our key results. We
conclude by reviewing the results, identifying the
limitations of the study, but pointing to some
provisional conclusions.
2. Entrepreneurship and policy options
Governments have a range of policies to enable
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) to
come into existence and to grow. The simple
justification for such policies is that SMEs are
major sources of job creation, innovation and
competitiveness in a modern economy and that
it is governments task to promote these char-
acteristics in order to enhance the welfare of its
citizens.1 According to Lundstro¨m and Ste-
venson (2002) ‘‘The general goal of SME Policy
is to strengthen the existing base of small
enterprises by ensuring they can compete in the
marketplace and they are not prejudiced be-
cause of their small size, relative to large
firms’’.
To deliver such policies governments are
faced with clear choices, with these being set out
in Table I, developed originally from Dennis
(2004). The key choices are shown in the col-
umns. The first is to focus attention upon low-
ering the entry ‘‘barriers’’ to new firm
formation. Examples of such ‘‘barriers’’ include
the length of time taken to start a business, the
number and cost of any permits or licenses re-
quired, or the minimum capital requirements of
a new firm.
A second policy option is to reduce the
‘‘burdens’’ on those individuals already oper-
ating SMEs. Such ‘‘burdens’’2 might include
the difficulties over the hiring and firing of
labour, obtaining access to credit, the severity
of the tax regime or the difficulties of closing
a business. These barriers are referred to in
the Table as ‘‘barriers to expansion and
growth’’.
A third policy option is to use public funds to
provide finance directly and indirectly, or to
provide information, training and advice soft
support to both individuals considering starting
a firm and to existing established SMEs.
As Dennis points out, governments in different
countries make different choices – the US
TABLE I
Linking entrepreneurial groups with policy options
Lowering barriers
to start up
Lowering barriers
to expansion and growth
Providing advice, support
and finance from public funds
Nascent opportunity entrepreneurs Strong impact Weak impact Strong impact
Nascent necessity entrepreneurs Strong impact Weak impact Strong impact
Actual entrepreneurs (young
businesses and established SMEs)
Weak impact Strong impact Strong impact
The table reports the hypothesised impact (strong or weak) of the policy option in the columns on the size of the entrepre-
neurial groups in the rows.
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broadly favouring the first two policy options
over the third whereas, until recently, EU
countries have favoured the third. Our purpose
in Table I is not to review the practicalities of
these choices but to theorise about their impli-
cations for new and small firms.
The rows in Table I show that policy choices
influence three groups of new and small firms.
The first two are nascent entrepreneurs – defined
as individuals taking active steps to start a
business – with a distinction being made be-
tween necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs.
The third group are the actual entrepreneurs
defined as individuals actually running a busi-
ness. This third group consists of newly estab-
lished young businesses, as well as established
SMEs or small firms.
We now take each of these groups in turn and
theorise about the expected impact of the poli-
cies on each group, beginning with the two
groups of nascent entrepreneurs. It would cer-
tainly be argued by Djankov et al. that the
number of nascents would be increased if bar-
riers to start up were lowered. However, it is less
clear whether it is the necessity or the opportu-
nity nascent entrepreneurs that will be most
influenced by the lowering of entry barriers. On
the one hand necessity entrepreneurs may be
particularly strongly influenced by, for example,
the costs of start up being lowered since these
individuals are likely to have lower wealth than
opportunity entrepreneurs. On the other hand,
opportunity nascents are assumed to have a
wider range of employment options than
necessity nascents and so lowering entry costs
may have a strong marginal effect.
It seems likely that nascent entrepreneurs will
be less influenced by barriers to growth than by
barriers to entry on the grounds that nascents
are less likely to have business experience. They
will be less likely therefore to have actually
encountered such barriers. A possible distinction
is that opportunity nascents may have higher
growth expectations than necessity nascents and
so may be more likely to be deterred if they
think they are likely to be prevented from their
business reaching optimal size. Finally we might
expect, all else equal,3 for nascent rates to be
higher in countries that provide advice, support
and funds.
Turning now to young and established busi-
nesses we assume that they would be more
strongly influenced by barriers to expansion and
by the provision of advice and support, than by
start-up barriers. A priori it is not clear whether
the advice or the barriers would be more influential.
The hypothesised effects described above are
summarised in Table I.
3. Data on entrepreneurship rates and regulations
Ideally, we would like to quantify all the rela-
tionships in Table I but, in practice, we are
constrained by data limitations. In particular,
cross-country data on the provision of advice
and support are not available. Whilst Lund-
strom and Stevenson (2005) provide a compre-
hensive description of such policies, this is
restricted to only 13 countries and there is no
data on aggregate policy expenditure. In terms
of Table I therefore, the relationships in the final
column cannot be estimated. We will now pro-
vide an overview of our data on entrepreneurship
rates and on business regulations. The variables
are set out in full in the next section of this
paper.
Data on rates of entrepreneurship are derived
from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM). A distinction is made between the
young business entrepreneurship rate, defined as
the percent of the adult population that is the
owner/manager of a business that is less than
42 months old, and the nascent entrepreneur-
ship rate, defined as the percent of adult popu-
lation that is actively involved in starting a new
venture (Reynolds et al., 2002, 2005).
These rates are the dependent variables in our
model (see also the next section) but, following
Table I, we distinguish between the opportunity
and necessity nascent entrepreneurship rates and
the young business entrepreneurship rate. Our
final entrepreneurship measure is the established
business rate, defined as the percent of the adult
population that is the owner/manager of a
business that is older than 42 months. This is
not a dependent variable in our model because
we expect the impact of business regulations to
be particularly important in the early stages of
the business. However the established business
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rate does play a role in our empirical exercises
on the right hand side of the equations. Full
details of the various GEM measures are shown
in Table III.
Data on business regulations are taken from
the World Bank Doing Business (WBDB) data
base. According to the WBDB website ‘‘The
Doing Business database provides objective
measures of business regulations and their
enforcement. The Doing Business indicators are
comparable across 155 economies. They indicate
the regulatory costs of business and can be used
to analyse specific regulations that enhance or
constrain investment, productivity and growth.
The indicators are placed in categories such as
Starting a business, Hiring and firing of
workers, Getting credit, etc. The precise defi-
nition of these indicators is provided in the next
section.
As an illustration, Table II shows the number
of days required to start a business for those
countries participating in the GEM in 2005. This
variable is taken from the WBDB category
Starting a business, which is associated with the
TABLE II
Number of days required to start a business and entrepreneurship rates in 2005
Number of days
required to start a business
Young business
entrepreneurship rate
Opportunity nascent
entrepreneurship rate
Necessity nascent
entrepreneurship rate
Australia 2 4.66 4.99 0.49
Canada 3 3.59 4.9 0.69
United States 5 5.23 7.16 1.06
Iceland 5 2.73 4.05 0.16
Denmark 5 2.44 1.5 0.08
Singapore 6 3.67 3.08 0.54
France 8 0.68 1.46 1.1
Jamaica 9 6.66 5.49 3.23
Netherlands 11 1.93 1.81 0.16
New Zealand 12 9.99 7.72 0.77
Norway 13 5.17 3.69 0.15
Italy 13 2.25 2.21 0.43
Finland 14 1.88 1.85 0.16
Sweden 16 2.54 1.33 0.17
United Kingdom 18 2.92 2 0.29
Latvia 18 2.77 2.91 0.6
Switzerland 20 3.71 2.28 0.16
Ireland 24 4.73 4.34 1.12
Germany 24 2.71 1.91 0.67
Chile 27 5.31 4.39 1.5
Austria 29 2.37 2.36 0.25
Japan 31 1.14 0.86 0.16
Argentina 32 3.93 4.43 1.4
Thailand 33 13.06 6.4 1.23
Belgium 34 1.17 1.7 0.11
South Africa 38 1.74 1.89 1.14
Greece 38 1.6 2.69 0.52
Hungary 38 0.82 0.37 0.11
Spain 47 3.36 2.08 0.3
China 48 9.4 3.67 1.16
Croatia 49 2.5 1.66 2.11
Mexico 58 1.36 2.78 0.6
Slovenia 60 1.44 2.29 0.22
Venezuela 116 7.48 11.16 6.83
Brazil 152 8.17 1.71 1
Average 30.17 3.86 3.29 0.88
Sources: WBDB and GEM.
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policy option lowering barriers to start up in
Table I.4 While in this paper we use several vari-
ables to reflect regulation we focus on this
particular indicator because it plays such an
important role in the influential Djankov et al.
study. Table II also includes data on the depen-
dent variables of this study, i.e. young business
and nascent entrepreneurship rates, classified by
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship.
4. Modelling and data considerations
4.1. Model
To examine the determinants of nascent entre-
preneurship and young business entrepreneur-
ship we will estimate a two-equation model
explaining these entrepreneurship rates sepa-
rately, while taking into account the interrela-
tionship between the two variables. Our model
takes the following form:
N=f(X1;G) ð1Þ
Y=f(N,X1,X2,G) ð2Þ
where N is the nascent entrepreneurship rate, Y
is the young business entrepreneurship rate, X1
is the vector of explanatory variables reflecting
the supply side of entrepreneurship, X2 is the
vector of explanatory variables reflecting the
demand side of entrepreneurship, G is the vector
of explanatory variables reflecting government
intervention.
The set-up of the model parallels Grilo and
Irigoyen (2006) where survey data from the 15
EUMember States and the US for the year 2000
are used in the framework of a two-equation
model to establish the effect of demographic and
other variables on latent and actual entrepre-
neurship. Latent entrepreneurship is measured
by the probability of a declared preference for
self-employment over employment.5 While the
Grilo and Irigoyen model refers to the micro
(individual) level, the model employed in the
current paper is defined at the macro (country)
level. The first equation explains the nascent
entrepreneurship rate using policy regulations
and various controls. The second equation
explains the young business entrepreneurship
rate using policy regulations, various controls
and the nascent entrepreneurship rate. The idea
is that nascent entrepreneurship is a necessary
condition for becoming a business owner. In
other words: there is a natural ordering in
entrepreneurial engagement levels (Grilo and
Thurik, 2005, 2006). Hence, the nascent entre-
preneurship rate appears both as a dependent
variable in Equation (1) and as an independent
variable in Equation (2). In the latter equation
the coefficient of the nascent rate may be inter-
preted as the conversion effect from nascent to
actual (young business) entrepreneurship. A
higher coefficient suggests that a higher
proportion of individuals who are in the process
of starting a business actually succeed in setting
up the business (i.e., they convert from nascent
entrepreneur into young business entrepreneur).
We recognise that the conversion interpretation
is imperfect as GEM currently does not follow
individual nascent entrepreneurs over time
(Sternberg and Wennekers, 2005). Nevertheless
we consider it likely that a strong statistical
association between nascent and actual young
business entrepreneurship at the macro level
implies a strong statistical association at the
micro level (the latter implying conversion in the
actual meaning of the word). For this reason we
will use this interpretation throughout the paper.
Verheul et al. (2002) develop an eclectic
framework for the determinants of entrepre-
neurship distinguishing between the demand
side and the supply side of entrepreneurship and
government intervention.6 The demand and
supply side factors create aggregate conditions
that influence the so-called risk-reward profile of
individuals which forms the basis for the entre-
preneurial decision made at the individual level.
The demand side creates entrepreneurial
opportunities through the market demand for
goods and services, whereas the supply side
provides potential entrepreneurs that can act
upon these opportunities (Verheul et al., 2002).
Examples of demand side factors are techno-
logical development, globalisation and indus-
trial structure, whilst examples of supply
side factors are education, age structure of
population and availability of capital. Finally
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government intervention may also influence the
demand and/or supply of entrepreneurs.
Examples here include issues upon which this
paper focuses: entry regulation, labour market
regulation and the social security system.7
We use the incumbent business ownership
rate as an indicator of the demonstration effect.
It has a special place in the eclectic framework in
the sense that it directly influences the risk-
reward profile of individuals (instead of through
the aggregate conditions created by the demand
and supply side factors). The more common
entrepreneurship is in an economy (i.e., the
more businesses there are), the more attractively
entrepreneurship is perceived, independent of
existing opportunities or individual characteris-
tics. Incumbent business ownership is opera-
tionalised as the established business rate, as
measured by the GEM. The established business
rate is defined as the number of owner/managers
in businesses older than 42 months as a
percentage of adult population.
In terms of our model, supply side factors
influence the stock of potential (or nascent)
entrepreneurs. These factors may also influence
the stock of young business entrepreneurs. Hence
X1 appears both in Equation (1) and in Equation
(2). However, demand side factors may influence
the young business rate rather than the nascent
rate because they influence the market room for
new businesses. Hence they influence the number
of actual new-firm start-ups, and so X2 appears
only in Equation (2).8 Government intervention
factors influence both the nascent and the actual
young business entrepreneurship rate. Further-
more, to test for the conversion effect, the nas-
cent rate is also included as an explanatory
variable in the young business equation.
Although the distinction between the supply
and demand-side of entrepreneurship can be
made conceptually, it is less clear in a world of
proxy variables. To address this we will also test
for the impact of demand side variables on the
nascent rate, even though vector X2 is not in
Equation (1).
Finally, as theorised in Table I, we distin-
guish between opportunity and necessity entre-
preneurship. We assume opportunity nascents
are more likely to convert into an actual start-
up, because of their higher skills. This would
imply that the conversion coefficient in Equa-
tion (2) is higher for opportunity nascents than
for necessity nascents.
4.2. Explanatory variables
The vectors X1, X2 and G contain several vari-
ables. The supply and demand side variables of
entrepreneurship are taken from the Global
Competitiveness Report 2001–2002 (GCR) or
the World Competitiveness Yearbook 2001
(WCY). Those capturing government interven-
tion are taken from the WBDB data base.
4.3. Explanatory variables reflecting the supply
and demand sides of entrepreneurship
The supply side of entrepreneurship (vector X1)
is captured by: Ease of access to loans, Venture
capital availability, Working hours per year,
Secondary school enrolment and Tertiary
enrolment. The demand side of the entrepre-
neurship (vector X2) includes: Economic growth
rates, FDI and technology transfer, Com-
pany-university cooperation and Industrial
structure (share of services). The exact variable
descriptions are provided in Table III.
4.4. Explanatory variables reflecting government
intervention (vector G)
Five categories of variables derived from the
WBDB methodology are included: These are:
Starting a business, Hiring and firing workers,
Getting credit, Paying taxes and Closing a
business. Detailed descriptions are provided in
Table IV but, because of their significance for
the paper, they are also briefly outlined below.
The category Starting a business identifies the
bureaucratic and legal hurdles an entrepreneur
must overcome to incorporate and register a new
firm. It examines the procedures, time, and cost
involved in launching a commercial or industrial
firm with up to 50 employees and start-up capital
of 10 times the economys per-capita gross
national income (www.doingbusiness.org).
Measures on the flexibility of labour regula-
tions are taken from the WBDB category Hiring
and firing workers. It examines the difficulty of
hiring a newworker, rigidity of rules on expanding
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TABLE IV
Variable descriptions and sources, WBDB indicators
Variable Description
WBDB indicators, category Starting a Business
Procedures The number of different procedures that a start-up has to comply with in order
to obtain a legal status, i.e., to start operating as a legal entity. A procedure is defined
as any interaction of the company founder with external parties (government agencies,
lawyers, auditors, notaries)
Time The time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm, in calendar days. Time captures
the median duration that incorporation lawyers indicate is necessary to complete all
necessary procedures
Cost The cost of obtaining legal status to operate a firm as a percentage of per capita income.
It includes all identifiable official expenses (fees, costs of procedures and forms,
photocopies, fiscal stamps, legal and notary charges, etc.)
Minimum capital The paid-in minimum capital requirement reflects the amount that the entrepreneur
needs to deposit in a bank before registration starts. This variable is measured as a
percentage of per capita income
WBDB indicators, category Hiring and Firing Workers
Difficulty of Hiring Index Difficulty of hiring a new worker
Rigidity of Hours Index Restrictions on expanding or contracting the number of working hours
Difficulty of Firing Index Difficulty and expense of dismissing a redundant worker
Rigidity of Employment
Index
This variable is computed as the average of the Difficulty of Hiring Index, the Rigidity
of Hours Index and the Difficulty of Firing Index
Hiring cost This indicator measures all social security payments (including retirement fund;
sickness, maternity and health insurance; workplace injury; family allowance; and other
obligatory contributions) and payroll taxes associated with hiring an employee.
The cost is expressed as a percentage of the workers salary
Firing costs Cost of a redundant worker, expressed in weeks of wages
WBDB indicators, category Getting Credit
Legal Rights Index This index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate
lending
Credit Information Index This index measures rules affecting the scope, access and quality of credit information
Public registry coverage A public credit registry is defined as a database managed by the public sector, usually by
the central bank or the superintendent of banks. It collects information on the
creditworthiness of borrowers (persons or businesses) in the financial system and
makes it available to financial institutions. The coverage indicator reports the number
of individuals and firms listed in the public credit registry with current information on
repayment history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding. The number is expressed as a
percentage of the adult population. If no public registry operates, the coverage value is 0
Private bureau coverage A private credit bureau is defined as a private firm or non-profit organisation that
maintains a database on the creditworthiness of borrowers (persons or businesses). The
variable is defined analogously to the public registry coverage variable
WBDB indicators, category Paying Taxes
Number of payments The number of times the company pays taxes in a year is the number of different taxes
multiplied by the frequency of payment for each tax. The frequency of payment includes
advance payments as well as regular payments
Total tax payable This indicator measures the total amount of taxes payable by the business in the second
year of operation except for labour taxes. Labour taxes (such as payroll taxes and social
security contributions) are included in the hiring cost indicator (see above). The total
amount of taxes is the sum of all the different taxes payable after accounting for
deductions and exemptions. The taxes withheld but not paid by the company are not
included. Payable taxes are presented as a share of gross profit (defined as sales minus cost of
goods sold and labour costs)
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or contracting working hours, the non-salary costs
of hiring a worker, and the difficulties and costs
involved in dismissing a redundant worker
(www.doingbusiness.org). For all these variables
higher values imply more rigid regulations. Hence
the expected influence on entrepreneurship rates is
negative. For more details on these measures we
refer to Botero et al. (2004).
We also use measures from the WBDB cate-
gory Getting Credit. This quantifies two sets of
issues – credit information registries and the
effectiveness of collateral and bankruptcy laws
in facilitating lending. Table IV again provides
full descriptions. Higher values imply that
lending is easier, so the expected influence on
entrepreneurship rates is positive.
The WBDB category Paying Taxes reviews
the taxes that a medium-size standardised
company must pay or withhold in a given year.
The indicators included in the present study are
the frequency and scale of tax payments. Higher
taxes are assumed to make running a business
less attractive, so the expected sign of these
variables is negative.
Finally the WBDB category Closing a busi-
ness identifies weaknesses in existing bank-
ruptcy law and the main procedural and
administrative bottlenecks in the bankruptcy
process. The indicators include the time and cost
associated with going bankrupt, as well as the
recovery rate which measures the amount of
money claimants recover from an insolvent firm.
When the recovery rate is higher, banks may be
expected to be more willing to lend, hence this
may have a positive impact on entrepreneurship.
Also, when insolvency is efficiently organised,
more entrepreneurs having to close their busi-
ness may be encouraged to start a second time.9
5. Empirical analysis
5.1. Methodology and sample
We estimate Equations (1) and (2) using data for
47 countries over the period 2000–2005.
Unfortunately the data are not complete. First,
data for the established business rate are only
available for the years 2002–2005. But, as the
demonstration effect has been found to be
empirically relevant in earlier studies (Wennekers
et al., 2005), it is important to include this var-
iable in the model. Second, several countries
participated in GEM only once or twice. Third,
there are missing values for some independent
Table IV
continued
Variable Description
WBDB indicators, category Closing a Business
Time Time to go through insolvency in calendar years. This variable captures the average time
taken to go through insolvency, as estimated by bankruptcy lawyers. Information is collected
on the sequence of the bankruptcy procedures and on whether any procedures can be carried
out simultaneously. Delays due to legal derailment tactics that parties to the bankruptcy may
use – in particular, the extension of response periods or appeals – are considered
Cost Cost of the bankruptcy proceedings, as a percentage of the estate value of the bankrupt business.a
The cost of the bankruptcy proceedings is calculated on the basis of survey responses by practicing
insolvency lawyers.
Costs include court costs as well as fees of insolvency practitioners, independent assessors, lawyers,
accountants and the like. Bribes are excluded
Recovery
rate
The recovery rate, which calculates how many cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities,
and employees) recover from an insolvent firm. This variable more or less combines the former two
variables as the cost of bankruptcy proceedings is deducted from the initial available money, and the
recovery rate is then calculated as the present value of what is left.b
Source: World Bank, www.doingbusiness.org
aThe data are computed for a standardised case, where a limited liability company has downtown real estate as its major asset.
The company runs a hotel with 201 employees.
bThe third factor influencing the recovery rate is whether or not the firm survives as a going concern. In case the business is
liquidated there is an additional loss of value impacting the recovery rate negatively (see World Bank, 2005, p. 69).
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variables for the countries of Croatia, Uganda,
Jamaica and Latvia. All in all, this provides 124
observations. Finally, several test regressions re-
vealed that some observations do not fit in our
models in the sense that they have extreme residual
values for which we have no sound explanation.
After removing these observations we have an
unbalanced panel of 112 observations distributed
over 39 countries. Using this sample, all regres-
sions pass the Jarque-Bera test on normality of the
residuals.10 The distribution of these observations
over the countries is shown in the Appendix A.
The data set comprises variables that vary
over time, as well as time-invariant variables.
The GEM variables (the nascent, young busi-
ness and established business entrepreneurship
rates) and growth of GDP vary over time,
whereas the GCR and WCY variables are time-
invariant. Those from WBDB are available for
the period 2003–2005. We set the values for 2002
equal to those of 2003.11
In our estimation models we depart from a
baseline model which includes the economic
growth rate and the established business rate.
These variables are important as they capture
the business cycle effect and the demonstration
effect, respectively.
In Equation (1) we also include a poor
country dummy. It is often observed that
entrepreneurship rates are higher in poor coun-
tries because it is more often necessity driven, or
more associated with the rural sector. We in-
clude a dummy to correct for this. We choose a
per capita income level of 15,000 USDs in pur-
chasing power parities (year 2000) as the cut-off
point. The Appendix A shows the countries
defined as poor. In Equation (2) the inclusion of
this dummy is not required because the nascent
entrepreneurship rate (both opportunity and
necessity driven) is included as an additional
explanatory variable.
To summarise, our baseline model includes a
dummy for poor countries, growth of GDP and
the established business rate as explanatory
variables for the opportunity and necessity
nascent rates (Equation 1). The opportunity and
necessity nascent rates, growth of GDP and the
established business rate are used as explanatory
variables for the young business entrepreneur-
ship rate (Equation 2).
When estimating Equations (1) and (2), we
cannot include all explanatory variables from
Tables III and IV simultaneously because of
multicollinearity. To obtain an overall picture we
computed (auxiliary) regressions, each time add-
ing one variable to the baseline model.
The regressions were estimated using OLS. As our
data base contains very heterogeneous countries
we computed standard errors which are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Results of these auxiliary
regressions are presented in a working paper
version of the present article (van Stel et al., 2006).
We then build a complete multivariate model.
For each dependent variable we combine all
significant variables from the auxiliary regres-
sions into one model specification which also
includes the baseline variables. Next, we remove
the non-significant variables, to end up with a
model including only those explanatory vari-
ables which have a significant impact (next to
the baseline variables). In this process we also
take into consideration some restrictions that
arise from multicollinearity. For instance, as the
Rigidity of Employment Index is an average of
three sub-indices (see Table IV), we cannot
include the sub-indices and the overall index
simultaneously. For the opportunity nascent
rate and the young business rate, this led us to
include only the combined indicator.
The final results of the procedure described
above are shown in Table V. In reading this
table it is important to realise that empty cells
imply a non-significant influence. For instance,
the number of procedures has no significant
impact on the young business rate. In addition,
for each explanatory variable from Table III or
IV not included in Table V, it holds that the
variable has no impact on any of the entrepre-
neurship rates. For instance, the time it takes to
obtain legal status to operate a firm (see
Table IV) has been tested to have no significant
impact on the various entrepreneurship rates.
Again, the different steps leading to Table V are
shown in van Stel et al. (2006).
5.2. Interpretation of results
Table V contains several important results.
First, the impact of entry regulations on the
three entrepreneurship rate measures is limited.
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Of the four entry regulation variables (WBDB
category Starting a Business), only the mini-
mum capital requirement is an obstacle for
entrepreneurship. One interpretation of this is
that the creative entrepreneur either overcomes
or avoids bureaucratic burdens such as the
number of procedures or the amount of time
that is required to start up, even if these are
relatively heavy. However the minimum capital
requirement may be a more serious barrier
because even skilful entrepreneurs may not be
able to overcome this without access to assets.
This might explain the negative sign. Note
however that the impact of this variable on ac-
tual entrepreneurship (the young business rate)
emerges only in an indirect way, viz. through the
effect of nascent entrepreneurs.
Second, in contrast to the entry regulation
measures and our initial theorising, we find
strong negative effects on nascent rates of the
TABLE V
Estimation results
Equation (1) Equation (2)
Opportunity
nascent rate
Opportunity
nascent rate
Necessity
nascent rate
Young business
rate
Intercept 1.91
(1.2)
7.32*
(1.7)
).27
(0.3)
.18
(0.7)
Intercept poor countries 1.84***
(4.4)
1.48***
(3.1)
.90***
(4.9)
Growth .12**
(2.4)
.13**
(2.4)
).015
(0.5)
.037
(1.1)
Established business rate .31***
(4.8)
.29***
(4.6)
.11***
(4.4)
.26***
(7.9)
Opportunity nascent rate .33***
(5.2)
Necessity nascent rate .75***
(5.2)
Procedures .043**
(2.0)
Minimum capital ).0041**
(2.6)
).0059***
(2.7)
).0009**
(2.5)
Rigidity of Hours Index ).012***
(5.7)
Rigidity of Employment Index ).020***
(2.7)
).015**
(2.0)
).012***
(3.1)
Firing costs .0086***
(3.7)
Private bureau coverage .011***
(2.7)
.010***
(2.7)
.0036
(1.6)
Recovery rate ).010***
(3.1)
Tertiary enrolment (GCR) b .028***
(2.6)
).15
(1.4)
Employment share servicesa (WCY) ).032*
(1.7)
).11*
(1.8)
.014*
(1.7)
Interaction variable: Tertiary enrolment
Employment share services
.0025*
(1.7)
R2 .576 .611 .724 .856
N 109 109 110 112
Note: Absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent t-values are between brackets.
aEcuador and Jordan missing in WCY.
bTaiwan missing in GCR.
***Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level, *Significant at 10% level.
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labour market regulation measures rigidity of
employment and rigidity of hours. Where la-
bour market regulations are more rigid, entre-
preneurship rates are lower. Formulated
differently, in countries where the flexibility of
employers to hire and fire employees is higher,
the various rates of entrepreneurship also tend
to be higher. Two explanations for this are
offered. On the side of employees, the safety of
their paid job is less which may make them more
likely to decide to start their own business (push
effect). On the side of the entrepreneurs, they
have more flexibility in running their business
which makes business ownership more attractive
(pull effect). Both effects imply higher entrepre-
neurship rates. In support of our theorising,
however, the rigidity of employment index acts
as an obstacle for the young business entrepre-
neurship rate both in a direct manner (the var-
iable is significant at 1% level in Equation 2)
and in an indirect manner through the (oppor-
tunity) nascent rate.
Third, we find empirical support for the
conversion effect: the coefficients on the
nascent rate variables in Table V (Equation 2)
are highly significant.12 Countries with more
nascent entrepreneurs also have more entre-
preneurs in actual young businesses. Perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, nascent entrepreneurs
with a necessity based motive are more likely
to set-up a business than those who are
opportunity based. This may be because of the
lack of alternative employment options induces
more necessity nascents to actually start busi-
nesses because they (are forced to) put more
effort in the start-up process. Note however
that this does not imply that necessity nascents
are more successful in terms of economic
performance. Research by van Stel et al.
(2005) shows that in developing countries
where the number and share of necessity based
entrepreneurs is high compared with developed
countries (see Acs et al., 2005, pp. 18–21)
higher levels of entrepreneurship contribute
negatively to economic growth. This may
reflect the low human capital of entrepreneurs
in these countries,13 necessity start-ups have
lower survival and growth.
Fourth, the determinants of opportunity and
necessity entrepreneurship are different. GDP
growth rates have a significantly positive effect
on opportunity rates but no effect on necessity
rates. This is in line with our expectations:
higher growth rates reflect a higher demand for
goods and services, creating more opportunities
to start new businesses. The necessity nascent
rate is not affected as these individuals are not
influenced by demand. Furthermore, whereas
opportunity entrepreneurship is influenced by
higher education levels (tertiary enrolment),
necessity entrepreneurship is not. This emphas-
ises that opportunity based entrepreneurs have
higher human capital levels compared with
necessity based entrepreneurs. The positive
effect of tertiary enrolment on the opportunity
nascent rate (first column of Table V) suggests
that individuals with higher education levels are
more likely to start businesses compared with
others.14 The second column of Table V shows
the effects of tertiary enrolment and the share of
services interact. So higher tertiary enrolment
rates only leads to more entrepreneurs if the
share of services in the economy is sufficiently
high, and vice versa.15
Fifth, when considering the effect of the
business regulations categories Getting Credit,
Paying taxes and Closing a business, the var-
iable Private bureau coverage, is significantly
positive suggesting that if better information
about creditworthiness of potential borrowers is
available, credit rationing by lenders to small
businesses will occur less often (Armour and
Cumming, 2005). The influence of tax systems
seems to be marginal while for bankruptcy
regulation we only find a counter-intuitive result
for the necessity entrepreneurship rate (a nega-
tive sign on recovery rate). This is discussed
below.
Finally, the necessity entrepreneurship equa-
tion in Table V has several counter-intuitive
findings. First it shows the number of proce-
dures with which a start-up has to comply, and
the firing costs of a redundant worker are
positively associated with necessity rates.
Second, the negative sign for the recovery rate in
case of bankruptcy is also contrary to our
expectations. Our explanation for this is that,
in countries where business regulations are
particularly burdensome, business owners
are more reluctant to register their firms and so
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are more likely to operate in the informal
economy (World Bank, 2005, p. 3). Countries
with more regulations are also poor countries
(World Bank, 2005, p. 3) where the share and
number of necessity entrepreneurs is relatively
high (Acs et al., 2005). In short, these counter-
intuitive findings imply that many necessity
based entrepreneurs in developing countries
escape regulatory regimes by setting up their
business in the informal sector.16
6. Conclusions
This paper has examined the relationship, across
39 countries, between regulation and entrepre-
neurship using a new two-equation model. It
generates three key results. First, it finds no
significant impact on nascent or young business
formations of administrative considerations
such as the time, the cost, or the number of
procedures needed to start a business. The only
exception is that the minimum capital require-
ment required to start a business does seem to
lower entrepreneurship rates across countries.
Given the explicit link made by Djankov et al.
(2002) between the speed and ease with which
businesses may be established in a country and
its economic performance – and the enthusiasm
with which this link has been grasped by European
Union policy makers – our findings imply this
link needs reconsidering. Our results are more
compatible with a Baumol (1990) inspired view
that, whilst circumstances may influence the
nature of entrepreneurship in society, it remains
ever-present. We therefore do not subscribe to
the view that ‘‘heavily regulated’’ countries (in
terms of entry regulations) need only to reduce
such ‘‘burdens’’ in order to become more
enterprising and by implication more wealthy.
What seems more likely is that entry regulation
influences the distribution of business activity
between the formal and the informal economy,
rather than influencing the total volume of
activity.
Second, we find substantial differences be-
tween the determinants of opportunity entre-
preneurship and those of necessity
entrepreneurship. Whilst opportunity entrepre-
neurship is influenced by higher education,
necessity entrepreneurship is not. Our findings
are compatible with the view that many neces-
sity entrepreneurs in developing countries avoid
business regulations by starting and operating a
business in the informal sector. This result
stresses the importance of measuring numbers of
formal and informal entrepreneurs separately
(Verheul et al., 2006).17
Thirdly, we find it is labour market, rather
than entry, regulations which exert a stronger
influence upon both the nascent and the young
business rate. This is surprising since we would
have expected nascent entrepreneurs – those
considering starting a business – to have been
more influenced by immediate priorities, rather
than factors that only come into play once the
business is established.
We remain conscious of two limitations of
our work. First, the WBDB indicators are gen-
erally defined for relatively large new firms.
They relate to a standardised firm, defined as a
domestically owned limited liability company
with between 5 and 50 employees one month
after start-up. As the bulk of the entrepreneurs
captured by GEM operate in very much smaller
businesses, we implicitly assume that country
differences in regulations are stable across size-
classes. In other words, the countries where the
WBDB regulation indicators are high for larger
new firms are the same countries where it is
difficult to begin a smaller new firm.
Our second limitation is that we would have
liked in this paper to have examined the factors
influencing the rate at which individuals ‘‘con-
vert’’ from being a nascent to a young business
owner. The extent to which this transition, or
conversion, rate was influenced by entry barriers
would have been a stronger test than the one
used here, but unfortunately the available data
preclude it. Ideally we would like a panel data
set in which individuals are tracked through
these phases, whereas the GEM data are discrete
snapshots.
Notwithstanding these limitations, we feel the
current paper has re-opened an important de-
bate on a key policy area. If administrative entry
barriers play only a very modest role in
explaining variations in enterprise creation
rates, then the current ‘‘fashion’’ for countries to
compete by lowering these barriers needs to be
reviewed.
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Appendix A: Estimation sample
Table A.1 lists the distribution of observations
in our estimation sample over the countries. A
country can have 4 observations maximum (for
the years 2002–2005). It is also indicated
whether the country is ranked as a poor country.
In total we have 112 observations 26 of which
are of poor countries.
Notes
1 Storey (2003) argues that this justification is in fact too
simple because government intervention can have undesirable
side-effects such as increased bureaucracy through maintaining
(unproductive) policy programs. He argues that the correct
justification of government intervention is the existence of
market failures such as imperfect information on the private
benefits of starting a business or imperfect information on the
private benefits of obtaining external advice.
2 The term ‘‘burdens’’ is placed in inverted commas since,
although it is common parlance it is pejorative, implying that
there are clear costs and no benefits. On the face of it,
speeding and simplifying the procedures for business creation
seems to be a highly beneficial policy. If businesses are more
easily created these firms constitute a competitive threat to
existing businesses, compelling them to compete or to go out
of business.A second advantage is that, in some instances, the
business licensing procedure is the focus of corruption, with
those paying bureaucrats obtaining their licenses more
quickly. The elimination of such corruption has considerable
and wide-ranging social and economic benefits.
However, as with most legislative change, there are some
important contrary arguments. First, the prime function of
the business registration process is to enable some protection
of consumers from fraudulent or incompetent business
owners. Nobody would suggest that untrained doctors or
surgeons should be allowed to practice, and registration
provides the basis for the minimum check of the qualifica-
tions and track record of such individuals.
The wide acceptance of the need for doctors to register is
presumably because their incompetence could kill people.
But the same might also be said for an individual wishing to
establish a business as a driving instructor. Similar arguments
might then be applied to electricians who could electrocute
themselves or other people if they made errors. Like doctors,
both driving instructors and electricians could kill those in
their charge, so raising the question of whether the same
business licensing/regulations are appropriate for all three
types of business. If not, then this raises the supplementary
question of the nature of differences, and on what basis
should such differences exist.
Extending the argument, we might also all wish to be
protected from the financially unscrupulous. We might view
it to be the role of government to ensure that rogues are
identified and prohibited from trading. Again, registration is
a minimum condition for identifying such individuals. In
short, whilst we might all agree that excessive business
licensing is undesirable, wemight not all agree on the balance
between the interests of those in the business community and
consumers or others in society.
3 In practice holding all else equal is difficult since, as we
noted earlier EU countries with relatively high tax regimes fa-
vour the provision of advice more than the low tax regime of
the United States.
4 It is important to note that the WBDB indicators for
Starting a business focus on relatively large start-ups as their
standardised firm is a domestically owned limited liability
company which has between 5 and 50 employees one month
after start-up. This is far from ideal as many of the entre-
preneurs captured by GEM operate in smaller businesses.
However, a major advantage of the WBDB data base is that
the measures are readily available, and that they are com-
parable across countries. Our implicit assumption has to be
that country differences in regulations are stable across dif-
ferent types of firms (in terms of size, legal form or activity).
5 Blanchflower et al. (2001) use a similar approach while
their model should be interpreted as a reduced form. Grilo
and Thurik (2005) use 2004 survey data of the 15 old
Member States of the EU applying the original Grilo and
Irigoyen (2006) model.
TABLE A.1
Estimation sample
Country N Poor
country?
Country N Poor
country?
Argentina 4 Y Japan 3
Australia 4 Jordan 1 Y
Belgium 4 Mexico 2 Y
Brazil 1 Y Netherlands 4
Canada 4 New Zealand 3
Chile 3 Y Norway 4
China 2 Y Poland 2 Y
Denmark 4 Portugal 1
Ecuador 1 Y Russia 1 Y
Finland 3 Singapore 4
France 4 Slovenia 4
Germany 4 South Africa 4 Y
Greece 1 Spain 4
Hong Kong 3 Sweden 3
Hungary 3 Y Switzerland 3
Iceland 4 Taiwan 1
India 1 Y Thailand 1 Y
Ireland 4 United States 4
Israel 2 United Kingdom 4
Italy 3
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6 An update of the eclectic framework can be found in
Audretsch et al. (2007).
7 Supply side factors of entrepreneurship often interact
with government intervention factors. For instance, edu-
cation obviously influences the skills of people required to
become an entrepreneur (supply side factor). However,
education itself can be influenced by government inter-
vention through spending more money on the education
system.
8 Note that some of the determinants of the young
business rate may impact this rate not only through more
start-ups but also through the survival effect. For instance,
it may be hypothesised that countries with a higher average
education level of the population not only produce more
start-ups but also produce more start-ups that survive. This
effect is also captured in the model as the young business
rate measures all owner/managers of firms younger than
3.5 years.
9 Armour and Cumming (2005) investigate a different
aspect of bankruptcy law in relation to entrepreneurship
levels, viz., the time to discharge from personal bankruptcy.
10 12 Observations were removed in the outlier analysis.
11 Also, some variables are available for 2004 and 2005
only. In those cases the values for both 2002 and 2003 were
set equal to those of 2004.
12 Again we recognise that the conversion interpretation is
to some extent questionable as we do not follow individual
nascent entrepreneurs over time.
13 See also van Stel and Storey (2004) who provide (indi-
rect) empirical evidence that (UK) regions where more
start-ups are subsidised have lower economic performance.
The interpretation of the authors is that the subsidy pro-
grams cause many individuals with low human capital levels
to start businesses. As these low skilled business owners do
not grow their businesses and often leave the market after a
while, the net effect on regional economic performance may
well be negative.
14 This result is in line with Reynolds et al. (1999) who
conclude that the larger a countrys investment in education
at the tertiary level, the higher is the rate of new firm for-
mation.
15 It is straightforward to compute that the turning point
for the effect of higher education lies at a share of services
level of 61%, i.e., only when the share of services in an
economy is higher than 61%, will an increase in the tertiary
enrolment rate contribute to higher opportunity entrepre-
neurship rates.
16 Verheul et al. (2006) show that women may be more
involved in informal entrepreneurship than men. Based on
an analysis using GEM data they consider it likely that for
developing countries a substantial number of entrepreneurs
measured in GEMs entrepreneurship rates are owner-
managers of unregistered businesses. Based on their anal-
ysis the authors also argue that the distinction between the
formal and informal economy should be an important topic
for the GEM research agenda: how many informal entre-
preneurs are included in the entrepreneurship measures of
GEMs Adult Population Survey, and how does this affect
empirical analyses that make use of the GEM data base?
This issue is important in particular for studies focusing on
GEM countries with large informal sectors.
17 The call for measuring formal and informal entrepre-
neurship separately is also supported by observations made
by Capelleras et al. (2005). They argue that regulation does
not affect entrepreneurship but merely influences the nature
or form of that entrepreneurship. In other words it influ-
ences the distribution of entrepreneurship between regis-
tered and unregistered businesses. Unfortunately, the GEM
data does not tell us what types of firm are included in
actual entrepreneurship. In other words how many of the
actual businesses are registered, and hence appear in official
statistics and how many are unregistered? Amongst the
unregistered there are two categories, the first are those
which are legal, but merely are too small to appear in
official figures, and the second are those which are illegal.
We also do not know from the GEM data how many are in
these two categories because GEM follows individuals
without considering the number of businesses they have. So,
an individual in a heavily regulated economy may well
choose to establish more businesses which are below the
official registration threshold, whereas in a lightly regulated
economy, an individual may choose to establish a single
business but one that is registered. GEM data may be useful
to investigate these types of questions. However, for this the
set-up of the GEM survey would have to be modified. In
particular, we would need to know how many businesses
each entrepreneur has and also whether these businesses are
registered or unregistered.
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